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Income Distribution and Asset-Based Policies
――With Special Reference to the Kuznets Curves――
MARUO, Naomi 
Abstract
1, In this paper I have tried to show possible theoretical explanations of short-term and
long-term behaviour in the share of wages. Simon Kuznets suggested that there are in-
verted-U relationships between economic growth and income distribution; specifically,
income distribution deteriorates at the earlier stage of economic development when an
economy grows and per capita income increases rapidly However, after a turning point,
the relative income share of the low-income class begins to increase again. Since the be-
ginning of the 1960s, I have suggested a similar hypothesis with regard to the share of
wages. In the present paper I will explain the possible reasons for relative share be-
haviour. 
2, At the highly developed economic stage, the value of national assets tends to be-
come larger relative to national income The role of asset-based policies, therefore, has
become more central with regard to economic stabilization and economic distribution
than in previous periods. The higher the ratio of assets to income, the higher the share of
asset income to labour income tends to become. This means that the relative share of a
worker's income becomes smaller in the absence of any active asset policies to increase
workers' assets. The inequality in asset and income distribution is likely to become
greater. 
3, .As a result of changes in the relative value of assets and their global movements, in-
come and asset distribution across nations causes inequality between nations. Behaviour
patterns of income distribution must be reformulated taking assets and global factors into
account. As a result of the liberalization in financial and asset markets, the inequality in
asset and income distribution within and between countries will increase. 
4, Several recent studies have identified an inverted-U relationship between pollution
and economic growth. The inverted-U relationship is sometimes called the environmen-
tal Kuznets curve (EKC). It is interesting to note that there are common factors behind
EKC and the Kuznets curve, especially the behaviour of relative wage shares (WKC).
Both curves are influenced by (1) per capita income and the economic growth rate or in-
vestment ratio, (2) the  labour market situation, (3) the industrial structure, (4) peoples'
priorities (5) international factors, and (6) economic policies and systems. 
5, The share of wages plays a dual role in deciding wages. In the short run the higher
share of wages leads to an increase in wages, but in the long run the high share of wages
in this sense decreases the growth rate of total income. An optimum share of wages is the
The Stages of Economic
Growth and Income Distribution
From the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, the
Japanese economy experienced a structural trans-
formation into a highly developed economic stage
(Maruo, 1964). The structural change in the labour
market from a demand shortage to a supply short-
age as a result of the high rate of economic
growth was one of the main causes of the trans-
formation. In the transitional period, firstly, the
wage differentials by firm size, which had been
getting larger, began to reduce. 
Secondly, the share of wages,1 which had been
declining, began to increase. The behaviour of the
share of wages is assumed to behave as shown in
the V curve in Chart 1 (Kato and Maruo, 1963;
Maruo, 1965). The behaviour is similar to the
Kuznets U-curve with regard to personal income
distribution (Kuznets, 1955). There are several
ways to explain a declining trend in the share of
wages during the industrialization stage and an in-
creasing trend after the turning point (Maruo, 1965
and 1975).
Firstly, as Arthur W. Lewis suggested, labour
markets change from the unlimited labour supply
to a limited supply (Lewis, 1965)..
Secondly, the increase in investment ratio and
the rate of economic growth as well as the capital
/ output ratio influence the share. The well-known
relationship between the share of wages and eco-
nomic growth, investment ratio and marginal cap-
ital/output ratio2 suggests that the share of wages
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share that maximizes the wages in the long run. Assuming that all investment is financed
by profits of the company, the optimum share of wages approaches 50% as the period of
service is assumed longer and the propensity to save profit becomes higher.
6, This simplified model neglects the fact that workers have assets as long as their
propensity to save is positive. If we assume that the workers accumulate  assets and,
therefore, receive asset incomes, the above model is modified. A revised two-class model
à la Kaldor suggests that there is a possibility that equalization of asset ownership will
proceed as a result of a high relative share of labour combined with the high propensity
to save on the part of workers. This means that there is a possibility that an inverted-U
relationship will be formed in respect of the behaviour of asset ownership..
Chart 1  Hypothesis to explain the Trend in the Share of Wages W／Y
Share of wages
Rate of economic growth
Under-developed stage Industrialization stage Transitional period Highly industrialized stage
Turning point 
%
１ Share of wages = employees' compensation ÷ (employees' compensation + property incomes) 
declines when the rate of economic growth or in-
vestment ratio and the capital / output ratio in-
crease.
Thirdly, a feature of the industrialization stage
is the development of the heavy industry sector,
which needs a higher capital / labour ratio. The in-
crease of the relative weight of this sector will en-
tail a decline in the share of wages. However, af-
ter the turning point it is the tertiary industry, in
which the share of wages is relatively high, that
develops. The changes in industrial composition
will influence the behaviour of the share of wages.
It is highly probable that for these reasons the
share of wages tends to decrease during the indus-
trialization stage and increase in the transitional pe-
riod. Japanese experiences seem to support this hy-
pothesis. In Japan, economic development from the
industrial stage to the transitional stage began be-
fore World War Ⅱ, but was interrupted by the war.
The transitional period began again at the end
of the 1950s, when the declining trend in the
share of wages began to change to an increasing
trend as Charts 2 and 3 suggest (Maruo, 1963;
Maruo, 1965).
There are several definitions (a)～ (f) regarding
the share of wages in the national income base
(Kravis, 1959) .
(a) Employees’ compensation / National in-
come: 
Y
W
(b) Employees’ compensation / (National in-
come - incomes of the self-employed): 
( )Y E
W
-
(c) Assuming that per capita labour income in
the self-employed sector is the same as per capita
employees' compensation.: ( )
Y
W wN e+
(d) Assuming that the average profit rate is the
same as that of the corporate sector:
( )W P rK
W
e+ +
(e) Assuming the share of wages in the self-em-
ployed sector is the same as that of the corporate
sector: ( ) / .W E Y+ X If an economy consists of
the corporate sector and self-employed sector, (e)
coincides with (b)3.
(f) Wage share parity:
/Y N
w
. Theoretically (f) = (c)4
The share of wages in the national income base
in Chart 2 is calculated by definition (b), where W
: Total wages = employees’ compensation, Y :
National income, E : Incomes of the self-em-
ployed, N : Number of total workers, ,y
N
Y
N e= :
Number of the self-employed, N w : Number of
employees, w: Average wages = Employees com-
pensation ÷ N w, X: Share of wages, P: Profits,
r : Profit rate in the corporate sector, K e: Capital
assets in the corporate sector. Y W P E= + + is
assumed.
Chart 2 shows the observed figures ( ) and
the estimated figures ( ) by regression (1). 
( ) . . .
Y
W
b G
Y
96 147 0 942 0 928
1
r= - - -------(1),
(38.00)      (- 5.935)      (- 8.055)
2-R : 0.824
where Gr devotes the rate of economic growth in
real times. 
Chart 3 shows the behaviour of the share of
wages in the corporate sector. Equation (2) is an
example of regression in the share of employees'
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２ Assuming a simplified two sector model, the relationship is expressed as the following equations (Kaldor, 1960 and 1964).
Assuming Y W P= + , Y I C= + , and I S= , 
( )
Y
W s s vG s1 p w w= - - +# - ,
where Y W P= + , >s sp w , and Y vG
1 = is assumed.
Y : National income, W : Wages, P : profits, I : Investment, S : Saving, C : Consumption, sp: Propensity to consume profits,
sw: Propensity to consume wages, v: Marginal capital / output ratio, G : Rate of economic growth.
３
Y
W
Y
Y
E
W
Y
E
Y
W
Y
Y
Y
E
Y
W
w
w w w
w
w w
w
w+ = + =d n
４
( ) ( ) ( )
/
Y
W wN
yN
wN wN
yN
w N N
w y
e w e w e+
=
+
=
+
=
compensation in national income (a). The share of
employees' compensation increases as the propor-
tion of employees to total workers
N
N W increases.
N
N W is a dominant variable used to explain
Y
W (a)
as standard t statistics show. The proportion is,
therefore, not a suitable indicator to reflect the
relative share of labour incomes versus capital in-
comes.
尚美学園大学総合政策研究紀要第９号／2005年３月
8
1950 1960 1970 1980
Year
1990 2000
Sh
ar
e 
of
 w
ag
es
 %
66 
64 
62 
60 
58 
56 
54 
52 
50 
48 
46 
44
Chart 3  Share of Wages, Corporate Enterprise, all industries 
：Estimated figure by regression (1)：Observed figures, 　 
Chart 2  Share of Wages ：Observed and Estimated
Year
%
1950　   1955　   1960　   1965　   1970　   1975　   1980　   1985　   1990　   1995　   2000　   2005
84 
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64
( ) . . . . .
( ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . ) ( . )
[ . ] [ . ] [ . ] [ . ]
Y
W
a
N
N
Y
Y D43 197 0 393 0 513
1
0 389 5 181
293643 15 816 8 388 7 287 9 837
0 521 0 150 0 195 0 325
W= + - - +
- - -
- - -
:
----------------(2)
2-R : 0.973
Figures in (  ) are t statistics and figures in [  ] are standardized t statistics
Gr: Rate of economic growth in real terms
In the labour market, wage differentials by age
have been decreasing as a trend since the begin-
ning of the 1960s (Chart 4). The differentials were
especially large in large firms at the beginning of
the 1960s. The wage differentials among universi-
ty graduates in large firms between the average
wages of those aged 20~24 and those aged 50~54
decreased from 5.2 times at the beginning of the
1960s to around 3.0 times. In other words, the
proportion of average wages of 20~24 year olds
to the average wages of 50~54 year olds in-
creased from 19% in 1960 to around 34% in the
1990s as Chart 4 shows. A similar trend is ob-
served in the wage differentials by firm size. In
this respect, inequality in income distribution in
the working population has decreased markedly
compared with the beginning of the 1960s. Also
in the same period, as mentioned above, the rela-
tive share of labour increased. Common variables
are assumed to work behind the behaviour
changes in the share of wages and the wage dif-
ferentials.  
The situation is changing again, however. Ac-
cording to the latest SSM survey, the odd ratio
that expresses the social mobility between white
collar employees and blue collar employees dete-
riorated (Toshiki Sato, 2001). In the labour market,
wage differentials by firm size, which had de-
creased remarkably from the latter half of the
1950s to the middle of 1963, began to widen after
1975. Since the middle of the 1980s, income dis-
tribution, too, began to show greater inequality.
The increasing Jini coefficient from 1972 to
1999 may be partly explained by the relative in-
crease of the aged population (Ootake, 2000).
This is not the only indication, however. There
are many signs to suggest Japan has been chang-
ing in the direction of a more unequal society. In-
creasing inequality in asset ownership caused by
asset liberalization and globalization are possible
reasons to explain the change.   
Influence of Assets on Income
Distribution and Economic Sta-
bility
Distribution in asset ownership was also rela-
tively equal in Japan as a result of the radical de-
mocratization policy just after World WarⅡ.
However, from the mid-1970s, inequality of asset
ownership increased mainly because of the sharp
land price increase. The democratization just after
the War radically equalized the ownership of agri-
cultural farms. But the ownership of other land
was not equalized. The inequality of land owner-
ship increased in line with the marked increase in
land prices, and agricultural land was changed in-
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Wage differential by age group, gradute from university 
Average wagers of 20-24 years old / Average wages of 50-54 years old
Wage differential by age group, gradute from high school 
Average wagers of 20-24 years old / Average wages of 50-54 years old
Chart 4  Wage Differentials by Age Category 
Wages of 50～54 year old employees / Wages of 20～24 year old employees 
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to land for housing and commercial use. In the
1980s, more than 60% of the inequality in asset
ownership of households could be explained by
the inequality of land ownership. Since the 1980s,
a new type of inequality in asset distribution has
been observed as a result of liberalization and
globalization of asset markets. 
In Japan the proportion of the total value of na-
tional gross assets in relation to national income
has nearly tripled in the last two decades from 8
times to more than 22 times (See Chart 5). The
elasticity of gross assets with respect to national
income is estimated at 1.3 (Chart 6 and the regres-
sion). This is a fundamental reason explaining
why the role of asset-and asset-based policies has
become more central.
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Based on annual data between 1960 and 2002.
Source: Ministry for Economic and Financial Affairs, Economic and Financial Survey in 2004, Tokyo 2004.
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Chart 5  Gross National Assets ／National Income Ratio, 1960-2000
The new structural changes took place in 1973-
74 at the time of the first oil crisis. The average
rate of economic growth in real terms dropped
down to a rate half that of the preceding two
decades. The proportion of total social security
benefits5 to national income suddenly began to in-
crease (Chart 7) as a result of the slowdown of
economic growth and the Government policy for
coping with population ageing. The then Tanaka
Cabinet called 1973 " The first year of welfare"
and took positive policies to expand social securi-
ty benefits.. The development of social security in
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logY
logA = 0.508 + 1.305logY 
        (12.589)   (70.540) 
R2：0.992    Figures in parenthesis are t statistics.
lo
gA
Chart 6　National Income and Gross National Asset Value, 1960̃2002
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the 1970s improved the after-tax income distribu-
tion to a certain extent.
Thanks to the so-called economic democratiza-
tion reform just after World War Ⅱ, Japan be-
came one of the most equal societies among in-
dustrialized countries. As a result of the democra-
tization policy, the peerage system was abolished.
Large landowners disappeared. Japan became not
only economically but also socially an equal soci-
ety. According to opinion polls conducted by the
Government in the 1970s, 80~90% of the
Japanese answered that they belonged to the mid-
dle class. The SSM (Social Stratification and Mobili-
ty) survey, which has been conducted every ten
years, supports the conventional view that "Japan
is a classless society". 
Inequality of Asset Distribu-
tion between Countries
At the peak of the bubble economy, the world's
ten largest financial institutions in terms of their
asset value were all Japanese companies. The
market value of listed companies on the Tokyo
stock market became larger than that of New
York in terms of total current share value. House-
hold financial assets in Japan were the largest in
the world. It was in this same period that Japanese
companies bought New York's  Rockefeller Cen-
ter, Columbia movie studio, etc in the US. 
At the end of the 1980s, the relative value of
Japanese assets on average increased to a point
where it was three times as large as value in 1979
(Maruo, Björklund and le Grand, 2004)
However, the bursting of the bubble economy
turned the tables in favour of the US. The relative
share prices in Japan versus the US changed
dramatically, with the result that in the 1990s, the
relative positions of Japan and the US were re-
versed. The share price indices show that the
Japanese relative share value in 2000 dropped to
as low as 15% of that of 1989. In the 1990s, in
contrast to the US and European countries, which
enjoyed the benefits of the global liberalization of
financial and asset markets, Japan and a few new-
ly industrialized nations in Asia were seriously af-
flicted by depression. 
Experiences in Asian countries in the 1990s
suggest that introducing the same "global stan-
dards" for international competition on "equal
footings" to nations at different stages of market
development is sometimes not fair (Stiglitz, 2002).
Asset markets are more volatile than the markets
of goods and services. Liberalization of financial
and asset markets sometimes causes cumulative
economic fluctuations and unjust distribution of
asset ownership between nations and within na-
tions. Liberalization of financial and asset mar-
kets is also likely to widen inequality in asset
ownership within a country. In the transitional pe-
riod when a system shift takes place in financial
and asset markets, (1) asset allocation policies for
allocative efficiency, (2) asset stabilization poli-
cies for economic stability, and (3) asset distribu-
tion policies for equity are required.  
Asset-Based Economic Poli-
cies to Cope with Asset-Based
Depression
Japanese experiences in the 1990s suggest that
asset-based anti-depression policies are necessary
to recover from the new type of depression
caused by the depression of asset prices. In an era
where the economic influences of assets have be-
come so large, neither neo-classical policies nor
Keynesian anti-depression policies that are con-
cerned mainly with managing economic flows are
sufficient. Positive asset-based policies are some-
times required to make market mechanisms work
well. The Swedish case in the 1990s is of special
interest when studying policies at times of finan-
cial crisis (Englund, 1999; Jongus and Stymne
(1997); Maruo, 1996 ; Suzuki, 1999; Maruo, 2002). 
Comparing the contrasting anti-depression
policies of Sweden with those of Japan in the
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５ The concept of social security is defined according to the ILO definition. Social security includes not only income security
but also social services such as health services and personal social services.
1990s is most instructive. Sweden experienced
the bursting of its bubble in 1989-1990 and seri-
ous depression in 1990~1992 with a negative
growth rate, falling asset prices, balance sheet
consolidation, financial fragility, unemployment
and expanding public deficits. The timing and ex-
periences of the bubble and bursting were similar
to those of Japan, but the policies adopted then by
both countries contrasted with each other. In
1993, the Japanese Government introduced a typi-
cal Keynesian anti-depression policy in the form
of expanding public works, while the Swedish
Government in 1993~94 spent 4.66% of GDP not
on public works but to support financial institu-
tions. The difference in the effects of anti-depres-
sion policies in the two countries was impressive.
The Swedish economy recovered from depression
in 1995, while the Japanese economy has been in
economic stagnation more than a decade. This ex-
perience seems to suggest that asset-based poli-
cies such as separating bad banks from good
banks, injecting public money into banks in crisis
to issue new equity, and issuing guarantees to the
bank owners for loans that enabled the banks to
fulfill their capital requirements are more effec-
tive than Keynesian types of demand expansion
such as increasing government expenditure for
public works. We may interpret this as being be-
cause asset effects on depression are so large that
without restoring asset markets and improving the
balance sheets of banks, there will be no recovery
from the asset-based depression. 
Another important asset-based economic policy
that is required in the transitional period of finan-
cial and asset liberalization is a policy aimed at
inducing the shift of financial assets from so-
called indirect financing to direct financing.
If a larger portion of these financial assets were
to shift from small risk assets such as bank de-
posits and government bonds, etc. to higher risk
and higher return assets such as company shares
as happened in the US and a few European coun-
tries in the 1990s, share prices would increase and
the economy would be revitalized. We may as-
sume that if the proportion of investment in higher
return assets to total investment becomes larger,
share prices will be higher in the long run at least
to some extent, other things being equal.
Further, portfolio selection theories suggest
that diversifying assets is more efficient than "in-
vesting" all the money in one asset. However, in
Japan most personal financial assets are held as
safe deposits and private insurances. In 2002,
Japanese families had more than 1400 trillion yen
in personal financial assets. Most of these finan-
cial assets are owned as bank deposits, private in-
surance policies and bonds. Investment in compa-
ny shares and mutual investment funds amounts
to only 4.3% and 2.3% respectively. Moreover,
huge public and occupational pension funds
amounting to several hundred trillion yen are held
as safety assets and only 5% of the public pension
funds are invested in company shares. Asset allo-
cation in Japan is far from the optimum alloca-
tion. These ratios contrast with those of the
Swedish public pension funds (NDC), which in-
vest more than 50% of the funds in equities.
In the US and some European countries, dereg-
ulation of asset markets induced an asset shift
from low-risk-low-return assets to higher risk-
higher return assets. Besides, in those countries,
the governments introduced incentives such as tax
reduction to promote the asset shift. The defined
contribution pension plan 401 (k) in the US, Ev-
eryman's Fund (Allemans fonder) in Sweden, and
workers' asset formation schemes in Germany are
examples. These egalitarian asset-based welfare
polcies will promote an asset shift to equities and
a fair distribution of asset ownership by encourag-
ing workers' asset investment. As there is a large
information asymmetry between financial institu-
tion and ordinary people, and even between finan-
cial institutions, the market mechanism is not suf-
ficient to realize an optimum allocation and fair
distribution of assets. Government asset alloca-
tion and distribution policies are necessary, espe-
cially in countries where people are not accus-
tomed to risk-taking market activities." 
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Possible Effects of Asset
Policies on Economic Stability
and Distribution
Keynesian economic policies mainly influence
the aggregate demand curve, while policies sug-
gested by neo-classical and supply-side
economists mainly influence the supply curve. 
Asset policies are assumed to be mainly con-
cerned with managing the aggregate demand
through the effects on private consumption and
private investment. Asset-based stabilization poli-
cies do not replace Keynesian and neo-classical
policies but supplement them when financial and
asset markets fail to work well. The government
role is to set a sort of k% rule with regard to the
growth rate of aggregate assets value and use as-
set policies to maintain the rule.  
Asset markets are volatile. Liberalization of fi-
nancial and asset markets sometimes causes cu-
mulative economic fluctuations and unjust distri-
bution of asset ownership. In the transitional peri-
od when a system shift takes place in financial
and asset markets, positive asset-based economic
policies as well as egalitarian asset-based welfare
policies are required to make market mechanisms
work well and mitigate inequality in asset owner-
ship. Asset-based welfare policies as a third pillar
of the welfare state (Regan, Sue, 2000) will miti-
gate the uncertainty of people by supplementing
social security in income and social services,
which, in turn, will stimulate the stagnant private
consumption 
In a period of system shift in asset markets, as-
set based welfare policies such as spreading infor-
mation on asset markets and promoting workers'
share ownership through mutual investment
funds, etc. are effective means of mitigating in-
equalities in asset ownership and promoting effi-
cient asset allocation as well.
Due to the liberalisation of asset markets, there
is the possibility that income and asset distribu-
tion will deteriorate in developed countries unless
asset-based welfare policies are introduced. How-
ever, it is of interest to note that a revised two
class model à la Kaldor suggests that an equaliza-
tion of asset ownership is possible (Maruo 2003).
The model suggests that if the share of wages
multiplied by the workers' propensity to save be-
comes higher than that of ' capitalists' and that if
the return rate of assets is the same as that of the
capitalist class, the rate of increase of workers' as-
sets will become larger than that of ' capitalists'. 
This is because if >s w W r s P rw p p p , in future
Aw, will be larger than A p and the longer the time,
the greater the equality in asset ownership that
will be realized.
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
A
A
A r g
A r g
1 1
1 1
p
w
p p
n
p
n
w w
n
w
n
=
+ +
+ +
-------------------(3),
where A: assets, P: asset income, r: return rate of
A. Subscription w denotes working class and p
denotes' capitalists' class. A: denotes the initial
value of A, g: Growth rate of A, n: time or years.
Relationship between the
Kuznets Curve and the Envi-
ronmental Kuznets Curve
Many indicators show an inverse-U relation-
ship with income, whereby environmental degra-
dation gets worse in the early stages of economic
growth, but eventually reaches a peak and starts
declining as income passes a threshold level.
There are common explanation variables linking
the two Kuznets curves. They are differnces in (1)
per capita income, (2) economic growth rate and
related capital factors, (3) labour markets, (4) in-
dustrial structure, (5) peoples' priority, (6) interna-
tional factors, and (7) policy attitude, and (8) eco-
nomic system (Maruo, 2003).   
However, the environmental quality indicators
do not behave similarly. Some environmental in-
dicators such as clean water supply, sanitation,
suspended particulate matter, and sulfur oxides
have improved over time after a threshold level
(Seldon & Song, 1994). But others, such as fecal
coliform in rivers, have unambiguously worsened
(Shafik, 1984). The situation in Japan is nearly the
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same.
In addition to the difference by pollutants, the
quality of the environment differs according to
economic and environmental policies. Just as the
income distribution is more equal in the so-called
welfare states such as Scandinavian countries, it
seems that those countries where income distribu-
tion is relatively equal take more positive policies
in improving the quality of natural environment.
Difference in policy attitude is typically observed
with regard to policy differences in CO2 reduc-
tion. Those who study economic policies should
not dismiss the difference in policies.
An Approach to the Optimum
Share of Wages
Along with the positive studies on the be-
haviour of the relative share of wages, there have
been normative studies on the share of wages.
Just as the theory of optimum economic growth
assumes that the maximization of the present val-
ue of per capita consumption overtime is opti-
mum, the theory of optimum share of wages as-
sumes the share ratio that maximizes the present
value of wages in the long run is optimum.
Assuming a simplified two period lifecycle
model, the present value of employees' total com-
pensation including bonus, fringe benefits of em-
ployees in a company is 
*W W
t
W
1
1
2= +
+
-------------------------------(6),
where W means total wages, t implies the time
discount rate. *W is the present value of lifetime
wages (including fringe benefits). The total wages
of each period are;
W V1 1= X -----------------------------------------(7)
W Vn2 1= X -------------------------------------(8),
where n means the length of service period 2 to
period 1.
X: share of wages including fringe benefits. in
value added. V means value added. Subscript fig-
ures denote a period. For example denotes V1 in
period 1 and V2 denotes V in period 2.
Assuming that the investment of a company is
solely financed by profits of the company, an in-
crease of value added ( V1 ) depends on the share
of wages X as (9) shows;
( )V S V1p 11 = -v X ---------------------------(9)
As W V1 1= X , substituting (9) into V1 , the
dual effects of X are shown in Eq (10).. 
( )W S V1p 11 = -v X -------------------------(10)
Differentiating Eq. (10) with respect to X：
/1 2=X ------------------------------------------(11)
These equations show that the share of wages
has a dual effect of X on wage increase W1 .
Chart 10 visualizes the dual relation between X
and W1 . The Chart shows that the larger share of
wages reduces the increment of value added and
therefore that the larger share of wages does not
always increase the increment of wages. Under
this most simplified assumption, the share of
wages that maximizes the increment of wages is
2
1
as equations (9) and (11) suggest. The share of
wages that maximizes the total wages of an em-
ployee's lifetime at present value can also be de-
duced.
Assuming the share of wages is the same in the
second period the wages in the second will be
shown as follows. 
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６ When a part of investment is financed by borrowed money, we may assume that the interest of the money is asset income of
capitalist. 
Chart 10   Dual Effects of the Share of wages on Wages
⊿V
⊿W=　⊿V
X
X
( )
W
t
V s n
1
1p
2
1
=
+
-vX X
-----------------------(12)
If we assume a simplified two period model,
the present value of lifetime wages including
fringe benefit can be obtained by combining (7)~
(8).
*W W W V
t
V n
1
1 2 1
2= + = +
+
X X ---------------(13)
Assuming that investment is financed only by
the profit of the company6 and 1= -r X, total
sum of the present value of wages is
( )
W W V
t
V s n
1
1p
1 2 1
1
+ = +
+
-v
X
X X
----------(14)
Substituting Eq. (13) into (Eq. (12), 
Differentiating Eq. (13) with respect to Ω, the
optimum share of wages in the sense that maxi-
mizes the present value of employees' life-time
income is deduced.
*W s n
t
2
1
1
1
p
= +
+
vd n--------------------------(15)7,
where *W : present value of lifetime wages, W1:
total wages including fringe benefits in period 1,
t: time discount rate, V : value added, X: share of
wages as % of value added. Value added is as-
sumed as Wages + Profits. S p: savings ratio of the
company profits = (1－pay-out ratio of profits),
v productivity of investment. Subscription 1 de-
notes period 1, and 2 denotes period.2 
Simplified Eq. (15) suggests that the optimum
share of wages is increasing functions of n, v
and S p and time discount ratio t is a decreasing
function. When n , S p and v are sufficiently
large, the optimum share of wages approaches to
1/2 (50%).This relationship is what I called the
theorem of the share of wages (Maruo, 1997). In
Japanese large firms n is large because of the
practice of lifetime employment. The dividend ra-
tio( s1 p- )has been kept low. Because of Japanese
people's " senyuu kouraku (work and save at present
to enjoy later)" mentality, we may assume that t
has also been low.
One of the reasons for the low share of wages
and low pay-out ratio in the 1950~1980s in
Japanese large firms that have made the high rate
of productivity growth possible may partly be at-
tributed to the rational behaviour of employees.
They agreed to restrain the share of wages on
conditions mentioned above in order to increase
the size of "the future pie".
Influence of workers' saving
and share ownership on the
optimum share of wages
So far we have assumed that investment is fi-
nanced solely by the profits of the company.
When a part of the investment of a company is fi-
nanced by borrowed money, the relationship is
somewhat complex. Still the fundamental rela-
tionship and the optimum share of wages do not
change, if the interest paid on borrowed money is
counted as a part of profits.
However, if we assume that a part of the sav-
ings of the company is financed by the savings of
employees' share ownership plans, etc., an impor-
tant change takes place as to the savings function
and the distribution of share ownership. The in-
vestment of a company is now financed by the
savings from both profits and wages as the Kaldo-
rian saving function shows; 
( ) ( )S S S S1p w w= - - +X ---------------------(16)
Therefore, Eq. (10) is modified into Eq. (17).
( ) ( ) .W V S S S1p w w1 = - - +vX X# - -----(17)
Differentiating Eq. (17) with respect to X, we
obtain the share of wages that maximizes the in-
crement of wages: 
Optimum 
S S
S
2
1
p w
w=
-
X ----------------------(18)
Eq. (18) shows that the share of wages that
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７ Equation (15) is deduced as follows.
maximizes the increment of wages becomes high-
er than 
2
1
when Sw is positive ( S S
S
p w
w
-
). The rela-
tion holds fundamentally with two period model.
This implies that this condition is realized and if
the saving of employees are used to finance in-
vestment, the optimum share of wages to maxi-
mize the increment of wages increases and there-
fore the share of wages that maximizes the pre-
sent value of the lifetime income of employees
will also increase. This implication is very impor-
tant to solve or mitigate the trade-off between
high productivity increase and equity for employ-
ees .
Concluding remarks
So far I have explained how the role of assets
has become more central than in previous periods.
In the conventional welfare state in the latter half
of the 20th century, "flow-based policies" such as
demand management and income redistribution
played dominant roles in stabilizing the economy
and achieving a fair distribution of income8. In the
new stage of the welfare society, asset-based eco-
nomic policies and asset-based egalitarian welfare
policies will play important roles. In 2003 and
2004, asset prices, mainly land and share prices,
are still stagnant in Japan. Liberalization of the fi-
nancial market is definitely necessary to improve
economic efficiency. However, the experiences of
Japan and a few countries in Asia suggest that the
liberalization with the so-called "global stan-
dards" for financial and asset markets worked un-
favourably for those countries that had little expe-
rience and information with regard to the liberal-
ization of financial and asset markets (stiglitz,
2002; Maruo, Björklund and le Grand, 2005). More-
over, .the US experience suggests that it will in-
crease the distributive inequality in financial asset
ownership9. The  liberalization and globalization
of financial and asset markets will result in unex-
pected distribution between nations and within
nations.
In the new stage of economic development, we
should attach more importance to the roles of as-
sets and asset policies to cope with income and
asset allocation and distribution.
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